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Abstrak 
Pengalaman ber-Islam di dunia modern membentuk ulang hubungan antara 
manusia dan Tuhan atas dasar otoritas fundamental dari Al Qur’an. Masjid 
sebagai simbol, adalah momumen kekuasaan politik yang mengandung 
sejumlah kontradiksi yang paling mendasar yang mencirikan masyarakat 
Muslim di dunia modern. Kontradiksi demikian berlaku bagi sejumlah 
karakter yang diasosiasikan dengan masjid,  ia mungkin mencitrakan ciri 
“terbuka”, “toleran”, “cosmopolitan”, “modern” dari Muslim yang 
reformis, yang mengepung pemerintah dalam pertentangannya melawan 
kelompok-kelompok oposisi militant yang mengadopsi Islam sebagai sebuah 
instrumen naratif dan perjuangan yang berjangkauan luas. Para reformis, 
aktivis, dan militan Muslim selalu mengatakan bahwa mereka adalah sebuah 
“gerakan”, sebuah “keberadaan” yang masih dalam proses perkembangan 
dan evolusi. Politik emansipasi memberi perhatian pada, lebih dari 
segalanya, tema-tema keadilan, kesetaraan dan partisipasi, tema-tema yang 
pada kenyataannya sama persis pada mana sebagian besar Muslims reformis 
memberi perhatian. Pengalaman ber-Islam melibatkan pendefinisian ulang 
identitas yang telah menjadi terseragamkan oleh proses modernisasi global. 
Pengalaman keber-Islam-an karenanya adalah sebuah panggilan untuk 
politik emansipatoris yang berarti pencapaian keadilan yang sedang tidak 
terjadi, distribusi kesejahteraan yang lebih egaliter dan pengambilan 
keputusan yang lebih demokratis. 
Kata Kunci: Islam, pengalaman beragama, postmodernisme 
 
Abstract  
The Islamic experience in the modern world reconstitutes the relation 
between human and God on the basis of the fundamental authority of the 
holy Quran. Mosque as a symbol, this monument to political power contains 
some of the most basic contradictions thats characterize Muslim societies in 
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the modern world. A similar distinction applies to the to the morning 
officialy attributed to the mosque, it maybe “open”, “toleran”, 
“cosmopolitan”, and “modern” Muslim reformers, embattled governments 
against increasingly militant oppositional groups which have adopted Islam 
as an overarching instrument of discourse and struggle. Muslim reformers, 
activists, and militants nearly always say that theirs is a “movement”, a 
‘current” which is still in the process of gestation and evolution. 
Emancipatory politics is concerned, above all, with themes of justice, 
equality, and participation, the very same themes that most Muslim 
reformers are in fact concerned with. Islamic experience involves a 
redefination of identity in a world which has become homogenized by the 
globalizing process of modernism The Islamic experience is therefore a call 
for an emancipatory politics which means justice where there is none, a more 
egalitarian distribution of wealth and a more democratic system of decision 
making. 
Keywords: Islam, religious experience, postmodernism 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The Islamic Experience in the modern world reconstitutes the 
relation between human and God on the basis of the fundamental 
authority of the holy Quran. This is a fundamentally proccess of 
redefinition which involves a religious reformulation with far-
reaching political implication. Unlike other monotheistic religions, 
Islam, at its core, makes no distinctions between individual and 
individual and between individual and the states. The original 
position in Islam consisted of the creation in Medina (the holy city of 
the Prophet) of a just order predicated on the word of God. We 
cannot therefore examine Islamic religious experience without 
disscussing it in the political and social context. 
At the same time, Islamic religious experience is a response to 
prevailing interpretations of the world. In the original position, Islam 
was in part of response to the polytheism of the tribes in Arabian 
Peninsula and in part to Christianity and Judaism as they were 
practiced in the Near East. In the modern age, it is a response to 
modernism and its various manifestation in the West. From the 
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beginning of the nineteenth century, Islam has in fact been especially 
preoccupied with fashioning a response to hegemonic power of the 
modernizing West and the intrusion into Muslim societies of 
Western and therefore alien modes of thinking and behavior. 
This article will examine the Islamic experience in a attempt to 
confront modernism both as a weltanschauung and as a set 
institutions represented by the apparatus of the modern state. The 
key argument here is that the modern Islamic revivalist movement in 
all of its parts in various Arab and Muslim countries constitutes 
primarily a process of evolution. For this reason, it is unlikely that 
we will find in the corpus of writings by Muslim activist in the 
current period a coherent and systematic critique that serious 
enough to generate theories in the future or weather it is simply all 
an ephemeral reaction to powerful influences from the outside.  
Throughout the Muslim world there are sectarian differences, 
for instance, in the case of Sunnis and Shi’a. But the most important 
difference is between official Islam and the Islam of the new 
reformers. The former benefits from government approval - there are 
religious appointments and there is official government assistance. 
The news media propagate  a version of official Islam. Friday 
sermons by religious authorities often endorse the ruling authorities 
and sing their praises. There is a more popular kind of Islam 
practiced by the masses of people who respond more enthusiastically 
to sermons of charismatic religious authorities who advocate an 
oppositional kind of Islam. The following story ilustrates the 
difference between the two and underscores the contradictions 
between them.  
A picture of a new mosque, a long with a story, appears in the 
New York Time; “A New beacon of Islam”, reads the official 
description of the gargatuan new seafront mosque in Casablanca, 
Morocco, which dwarfed a solitary visitor who leaned against an 
enormous pillar. The minaret, the higest in the world, rises more 
than 650 feet. At the top is a green laser beam which points the way 
to Mecca. The mosque sits on a promontory that juts into the Atlantic 
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Ocean and contains fifty four acres of traditional Morrocoan marbles 
and mosaics as well as an eleven hundred ton roof that slides open to 
reveal the sky. 
The mosque was designed by a French arcitect Michael 
Pinseau in close collaboration with the Morrocan monarch King 
Hassan II and took five years to complete. Work is still underway on 
the library, a vast underground garage, and an elaborate project 
designed to shift the flow of the city’s sewage several miles down the 
coast in order to make sure that the waters washing against the 
mosque are pure. A national fund raising drive has been mounted. 
Every morning the French language daily newspaper Le Matin 
carries the following headline on its front page: “Citizens, respond to 
appeal of King Hasan II, the commander of Faithful, the unifier, the 
savior, the assembler, and if you have not already done so, subscribe 
for the maintenance, upkeep, and management of the Hassan II 
Mosque.” 
The Morrocoan government spokesperson say that the 
mosque is intended to present “an image of a Muslim country that is 
open, that is tolerant, that is cosmopolitan and that is modern”. To 
underscore his modernizing intent, the King invited the Morrocan 
women poet Amina Mrili to recite her verses at the inauguration 
ceremony, to the consternation of the predominantly conservative 
Muslim society. By the most accounts, it appears that the 
inauguration ceremony, planned as an elaborate event, was in fact 




The Symbol of Islamic Society 
As a symbol, this monument to political power contains some 
of the most basic contradictions thats characterize Muslim societies 
in the modern world. The Hassan II mosque rises againts the sky in 
the midst of a decaying and dilapidated urban sprawl in a way that 
detaches it from and sets it at odds with its immediate surroundings. 
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By contrast, the great mosques in Cairo, Jerussalem, and Damascus 
emerge, almost logically, from the immediate social and architectural 
landscape. It is a natural thing for an individual, passing by, to want 
to go into one of these mosques for a brief moment of shelter and 
respite (Joseph, 1981: 286). It is difficult to imagine anyone doing the 
same here. 
A similar distinction applies to the to the morning officialy 
attributed to the mosque. It maybe “open”, “toleran”, 
“cosmopolitan”, and “modern”, but only in a specific and very 
limited way and in a particular direction. It is not open and tolerant  
as farm as its citizen are concerned – in Morroco as elsewhere in the 
Arab world, Muslim opposition groups are dealt with very harshly 
by the state in total disregard of basic  human rights and civil 
liberties. Openness and tolerance are directed toward the West, 
which the monarch, like other “modernizing“ leaders in the Arab 
and Muslim worlds, tries to emulate. It is no accident that one of the 
first heads of state to be given a tour of the mosque was none other 
than Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, who still represents for most of 
Marroco’s urban Muslim poor a country that is an enemy of Islam 
and of the Arabs.     
King Hassan’s version of Islam, similar to many others 
propagated by rulers in the Muslim world, is an “official” one, 
dictated more by the needs of political power than by the needs of 
community of believers. This distinction is very important because it 
accentuates the difference between a discourse that embrance power 
and one that challanges it. In the great mosques throughout the 
Muslim worlds, and in the small neightborhood mosques, very few 
people pay much attention to the Friday sermons of preachers 
appointmented of a few charismatics preachers who represent the 
dissident Muslim groups. Millions of cassettes of such sermons 
quickly circulate throughtout the Muslim world and beyond. 
In the time, the king Hassan mosque may eventually become 
appropriated by common Muslims who may find in it shelter and 
peace. In Cairo, around the middle of the ninetheeth century, 
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Khedive Tawfiq’s mother built the Rifai Mosque as a memorial to her 
power and celebrity. A very poor man in the area, known as Ahmad 
Abu Shibak, who had a saintly reputation, used to come to the 
mosque for prayer, meditation, and rest. In a few year, the mosque 
became known for the corner he occupied in it and people would go 
there to pray in order to be near him. In spite of the fact that five 
rulers of Egypt, in additional to the late Shah of Iran, are buried in 
the mosque, no one comes to visit their graves. In contrast, there are 
always candle lit where Ahmad is buried; most people come to pay 
their respects to him. In fact , the mosque has become known as the 
Rifai mosque after the name of the Sufi order to which Ahmad 
belonged. 
 
The Clash of Ideologies 
Throughout the Muslim world, a fierce contest is underway 
over the definition of society, the role of individual, and the nature of 
the state. The contest pits secularists against Muslim reformers, 
embattled governments against increasingly militant oppositional 
groups which have adopted Islam as an overarching instrument of 
discourse and struggle.  
The secularist claim that Muslim oppositional groups are 
attempting to seize power in order to establish theocratic tyrannies 
similar to the ones in place in Iran and in the Sudan. Their fear of 
such an eventuality has at times forced them to lend their support to 
governments which they have other wish criticized as oppressive 
and unjust. Secularist accuse Muslim reformers of failing to provide 
a clear and convincing alternative to the present oppressive system 
in power (Said, 1993). The reformers respond that only a return to 
the origins of the faith will halt the process of decay and 
disintegration now underway in the Muslim World. They argue that 
other methods such nationalism, socialism, and capitalism have so 
far been unsuccessful. The maintain that a rejuvenated Islam will 
enable Muslim countries to gain the necessary power to become 
respected part of world community.     
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There is an immediacy and an urgency to the debate now 
underway in the Arab world which differs in a marked way from 
similar debated in the West between secularists and politicized 
religious group. The difference derives, in part, from the weakness of 
the Arab regimes, their lack of legitimacy in the eyes of majority of 
their publics, and the closeness of their alliance with and dependence 
upon the West. While it is far fetched to think of religious 
fundamentalist seizing political power in the United States or in 
Europe, it is very possible that within a few years many of the key 
Arab governments could become Islamic republics. 
Several Western “frames” of this debate have been suggested. 
The most common and perhaps most persistent is a media frame that 
places the issue under the rubric of “fundamentalism” qua terrorism 
and fanaticism. This negative frame relies mostly on stereotypical 
images of warring Muslims who engage in Holy Jihad (struggle) 
against the West. Occasionally, this negative frame buttressed by 
academic interventions (Bernard Lewis, 1990, among others) that 
argue that a state of war exists between Islam and the West of, as in 
the case of Samuel Huntington (Huntington, 1993), that the contest is 
in reality a clash between two great civilizations.     
A variant of this frame views religious fundamentalism as a 
kind of postmodernism in the Third World Which encourages “ a 
selective attention to the past and an eclectic reconstruction of the 
present“ and arrives at an incoherent combination of the modern and 
the irrational. Pauline Rosenau (1992:152-155) quotes the following 
awkward, exaggerated, and erroneous caricature in Salman Rushdi’s 
Satanic Verses to illustrate this point:  
 
“History the intoxicant, the creation and possession of 
the Devil, of the great Shaitan, the greatest of lies – 
progress, science, rights .. History is deviation from the 
Path, knowledge is a delusion, because the surn of 
knowledge was complete on the day Allah finished his 
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revelation to Mahound .. Death to the timelessness of 
God. Burn the books and trust the Book”. 
 
It would be difficult to find anyone among so-called Muslim 
fundamentalist speaking in this manner. Muslims do not consider 
knowledge and admonish Muslims to seek it wherever it may be.  
A more responsible frame has been produced by the 
American Academy Project which offers a more inclusive and less 
pejorative definition of fundamentalism. Marty and Applenby (1991) 
argue that “fundamentalists begin as a traditionalist who perceive 
some challenge or threat to their core identity, both social and 
personal” and fight back with innovative power. They strive toward 
a “worldview which they have inherited or adopted and which they 
constantly reinforce” (pp. ix-x). Such movements reach back to “real 
of presumed pasts, to actual or imagined ideal original conditions 
and concepts” and select what they regard as fundamental. They 
fight against “generalized or specific enemies.. from without or 
within the group” and under the banner of God. 
 
The Muslim Reformist Voice 
Muslim reformers, activists, and militants nearly always say 
that theirs is a “movement”, a ‘current” which is still in the process 
of gestation and evolution. They do not view themselves as having 
produced a coherent ideology with a blueprint and set of 
comprehensive and concrete programs of action that govern social, 
economic, and political matters. Mannheim (1952) argues that a new 
biological generation, undergoing the rapid of social change, may 
created new collective impulses and formative principle original to it 
self. When this happens, says Mannheim, one will see the realization 
of potentialities inherent in the location and development of a new 
generational style or a new generation entelechy, In essence, what 
the new generation of Muslim reformers is trying to do is this: to 
draw from the past certain lessons or images that help them 
reinterpret the present and move toward the future. This is at one 
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and the same time a restorationist view of history. It is definietely not 
the classic restorationist view that harks back to a golden era or a 
mythic ideal past and tries to reestablish this in its full glory.  
What us that modern Muslim activists wish to restore? In the 
first place, Muslim wish to restore the sovereignty of God in human 
affairs as opposed to the sovereignty of the “people” or the “state” or 
the “individual”. Central to this objective is the belief in Tawhid, 
which in mystical term means unity with God and in orthodox 
terms, proclaiming the unity of God. In the second place Muslims 
wish to restore the centrality of the Quran as the Word of God. Here 
is the charisma of the text stands opposed to the dictates of reason 
and tradision: A person is not a Muslim who does not depend on the 
Quran and the Holy Prophet’s Sunnah (saying and deeds), but 
carries out the dictates of his own mind or follows the practice 
descending from his fore-fathers, or who conforms to what is 
happening in the world without carring to ascertain from Quran and 
the Sunnah as to how to handle his affairs” (Maududi, 1980:21) In the 
third place, Muslim activitist wish to restore patterns if behavior that 
are predicted on basic Islamic principles, duites, and obligations: as 
vice regent of God on earth, man is under obligation to learn of his 
household, and members of society. To service all of the faith. One 
cannot find this knowledge is one’s self (Nafs) which only contains 
corporal urges and may lead a person to drink wine, commit 
adultery, and be unjust to others. Neither should one rely on the 
advice of others who may be oppresive and use other people for 
selfish purposes.  
The duties of every Muslim are enshrined in a set of 
obligations that govern every aspect of a person’s life and are 
predicted on the following pillars: daily prayer (Salah) which is 
perfomed five times a day following cleaning of the body (Wudu-
ablution); fasting during the month of Ramadan; Zakat, which 
literally means purity and cleanliness and consists of setting aside 
aportion of one’s wealth to be given to the needy and the poor 
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(considered a way to purify one’s Nafs); and finally, Hajj or 
pilgirimage to Mecca at least once in one’s lifetime. 
The rituals are supposed to prepare the individual for a larger 
and more important task, namely Jihad. Here is how Maududi 
describe it: “It would be enough to state that the real objective of 
Islam is to remove the lordship of man over man and to establish the 
kingdom of God on Earth. To shake one’s life and everything else to 
achieve this purpose is called Jihad while Salah, Fasting, Hajj and 
Zakat are all meant as preparatory for this task” (Maududi, 
1980:243). For most Muslim scholars, bad government- which means 
unjust government- is the roof of all evil in the world. Here it must 
be noted that there are governments which do not rest upon the 
sovereight of God but which are stilljust, and others which are 
Muslim and unjust. The critical difference lies in adherence to God’ 
edicts in order to ensure justice for all. A just government is a strong 
one, one which will prevail over a Muslim government which is 
unjust. Jihad therefore becomes synonymous with the struggle for 
justice. 
In Islam, there are four major schools of thought –Hanafite, 
Malikite, Shafiite, and Hambalite – and a number of variations in the 
interpretation of basic text. One approach, Ijtihad, which literally 
means individual interpretaions on the basic tenets of the faith, is 
encouraged by the prophet himself. He showed his followers the 
necessity of Ijtihad. In one story, he ordered some of his followers to 
hurry to a specific town in order to carry out a particular task and 
order of their leader, waited until they reached their destination. 
Upon their return, they asked the prophet for this opinion. He 
aggred with boths sides, thereby endorsing private initiative even in 
such important matters (Gannoushi, 1982: 34-35).  
In a attempt to respond to rapid social change in their 
societies, Muslim reformers have tried to reaffirm the charismatic 
structure of the Quran and the Sunnah. Despite several decades of 
secularizing tendencies, governments in Muslim societies have failed 
to partition the social and cultural space in a way that leaves a 
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limited area for the religious sphere. The various governments tried 
to use the powerful instruments of modernization and its institutions 
as a way to counter the influence of religious rivals. They tried to 
coopt Islamic symbols, as a way of gaining legitimacy for themselves 
in the eyes of their publics. When this strategy failed, they restored to 
outright repression (as is the case in Egypt, Algeria, and elsewhere).   
Central  to the debate between secularist and Muslims in the 
question of how to confront modernity and how to organize the 
political, social, cultural, and economic space in modern Muslim 
societies. They key argument here is that Muslim reform activities 
amount to a fundamental critique of modernity and its institutions. 
This critique is in the process of formation and has not yet yielded 
major result at the levels of normative theory theory. It is therefore 
too early to make a sweeping assessment of this current. All that can 
be done at the moment is to take stock of what has been done so far 
by sketching out a basic outline of its main themes in order to see the 
direction in which developments appear to be heading. 
Rashed Gannoushi, the leader of religious revivalism in 
Tunisia abd one of the leading theorist of the contemporary Islamic 
revival, argues that we are now whitnessing the end of the era of 
modernism in the West. He refers to it as the era of “rebellion against 
God” (Gannoushi,1982: 173) which brought about the “disasters of 
colonialism and wars, widespread famine, sexual diseases, serious 
economic and phsycological problems, and rampant consumerism 
that destroyed the environment“. For Gannoushi, modernism 
originated in Europe following a series of revolutions that began 
with the French (1789/ and ended with the Bolshevik (1917). 
Modernism strangled the natural and instinctual dispositions of the 
individual toward God, religion, the family and public morality and 
glorified reason, science and progress.  
In opposition to this era of Jahiliya (ignorance and darkness), 
Gannoushi suggests a new era predicated on the recognition of 
human instinct, the unity of the spiritual and temporal, and the 
centrality of man’s existence as God’s vice regent on earth. Man, for 
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him, is a religious being. He has no natural right that he derives from 
himself or from others. Instead, there are rights and obligations 
which derive from the grace that God bestows upon the person. 
Gannoushi’s journey of discovery, or what he calls his journey 
of migration back to the self, provides an important setting for his 
critique of modernism and its manifestations in the Arab world. “I 
saw the light,”he says, “in an oasis on the edge of the Sahara in the 
southern part of Tunisia, whose people were known as rebels and 
warlike” (Ganousshi, 1992: 174). He was born in 1941, a period 
during which his hometown was caught in the middle of the Second 
World War that was raging between “competing Western forces. 
“Years later, he says, this peaceful oasis became an arena of conflict 
between the French colonial army and the first Tunisian armed 
rebellion. The Franch army was able, after a number of atrocities and 
local acts of treason, to capture the soldier who had led the uprising 
and to execute him in the village square. The martyrdom of this 
soldier eventually led to another uprising in the 1950s carried out by 
religious figure who became the founder of armed Islamic resistance 
(Jihad) againts French colonialism. Here Gannoushi relates a scene 
that he “could never forget (as if carved in stone in my soul)” where 
the French soldiers dumped the bodies of dead Mujahidin (fighters) 
in the village square and force the men, women, children to walk by 
to look at them. The rebellion spread throughout spread throughout 
the countryside to point where the nationalist (secular) leadership 
represented by Bourguiba began to worry about the rising influence. 
Eventually, the secular nationalists won the battle and achieved 
independence by making their own deal with the French. The 
betrayal of the forces of Islamic resistance by the secular nationalis 
forces thus became a central point of conflict between the two groups 
not only in Tunisia but throughout the various countries in North 
Africa and elsewhere in the Arab world. Decolonization therefore 
meant the ascendancy of the seculars with the help of the former 
colonial masters and the temporary suppression of Islamic groups 
that formed the core of popular resistance to colonialism. 
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The Muslim Struggle 
The theme of betrayal is commonly held among Muslim 
reformers and oppositional groups. Several historical instances 
illustrate its persistence throughout the Arab world. A recent 
example of this phenomenon is the ascendancy of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization as a result of the signing of the peace 
accords in Washingon D.C on September 13, 1993. Yasser Arafat’s 
Fatah group has consolidated its possition with the help of the Israel 
Government. Both the PLO and Israel have reached the conclution 
that they confront the same enemy, namely, Islamic fundamentalism 
in the occupied teoritories. Muslim Palestinian dissidents are hunted 
down by the Israeli authorities with the assistance of the PLO. 
Gannoshi’s journey take him to the Levent (Syiria and Egypt) 
where he joins the ranks of Nasser’s Arab socialist Union. He is 
severely disappointed as he discovers that the Arabism (nationalism) 
in vogue (represented by Nasserism in Egypt and the Ba’th Party in 
Syiria) at the time is simply not “authentic” enough and fails to 
represent the deepest aspirations of the majority of the people. 
Gannoushi departs for France in 1968 in order to purse higher 
educaqtion in Paris. Here he experience “the difficulties of life, its 
mad pace, it individualism, materialism and hypocrisy” (Gannoushi, 
1992:178). He finds “in this well some peace and shelter from the 
tempests that pursued me in a small oasis, a tiny mosque in a 
humble house in a poor working class neighborhood which some 
North African students helped establish”. It becomes the nucleus of 
Islamic Da’wah (missionary activity). He learns “humility, service to 
others, religious witness, and austere living”. He and his friends 
spread out among the Muslim student community and the poor 
workers teaching, arguing, and spreading the message of Islam: “We 
went to them in their poor quarters and their rotten bars and, in 
Latin Quarter, we argued with students from all over the Muslim 
world, especially from North Africa”. He establishes friendships that 
become, useful in later years. His stay in Paris is described as the” 
most difficult part of my life”. 
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Upon completion of his studies, he returns to Tunisia through 
Spain “the lost paradise of Andalus” (in reference to the golden era 
of Islamic rule in Spain): “I passed through Cordoba and wept in its 
beatiful mosque”. He returns to his oasis to “renew my struggle 
against Westernization which, by then, had become embodied in 
several generations of my people, in a state and institutions, in order 
to rediscover the Arabism of the oasis, of Islam and its message” 
(Gannoushi, 1992:178-179). 
Gannoushi’s migration (hijra) may be described as a journey 
of discovery, a Conradian “journey within” in search of authenticity 
and of one’s place in the universe, one’s roots and identity. In the 
contemporary Arab world, as in deed throughtout the Third World, 
there have been maqny such journeys involving troublesome and 
transforming encounters with modernism. A 1938 novel by Egyptian 
author Tawfic Al-Hakim, A Bird From the East, describes the 
sentimental journey of a young Egyptian student who goes to Paris 
to study literature, carrying with him Tales of Platonic love and ideal 
romance. He falls in love with beatiful Parisian Girl, becomes the 
prisoner of a new set of strange values and costums, is betrayed and 
returns to Egypt where he learns to look more realistically at the 
drabness and sordidness around him. 
 Another Egyptian novelist, Yahya Hakki, describes the jourey 
of another Egyptian student in London in his book The Lamp of 
Umm Hashim (1944). His piety and simple morality are ridiculed in 
the West. He falls ill and suffers a nervous breakdown. Upon his 
return to Cairo, the protagonist looks with horror at his childhood 
world and iin a fit of madness breaks Umm Hashim’s holy lamp, a 
symbol for him (a man of science and reason) of fanaticism and back 
wardness. The setting for Soheil Idris’s novel, The Latin Quarter is 
the Paris of early 1950s where a group of Arab students seek higher 
education and socialize with the beatiful girls of the bohemian 
quarter. Following a sad love affair with one of them, the hero return 
to Beiruty where he rebels against his mother, his friends, and their 
customs. Eventually the young man returns to Paris, finishes his 
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doctorate in literature at the Sorbonne and comes back to Beirut to 
become a passionate advocate of Arab nationalis (Takieddine-
Amyuni, 1980: 1-18). 
These novels describe simple themes of unhappy encounters 
with Westernism, of sexual liberalition and freedom. None of them, 
however, offers a sophisticated analysis of the encounter with the 
West and upon returning the difficulties of the encounter with 
tradition. A more complex treatment of such themes is undertaken 
by the Sudanese novelist Tayeb Salih in his Season of Migration to 
the North (Salih, 1978). The hero of this novel is the narrotor who 
begins as a romantic young man, spends seven happy years in 
London and then returns to his village in the Sudan. There here 
discovers Mustapha Saeed (who had also spent several years in 
London) engulfed in what Frantz Fanon had called a “Circle of Hell” 
(Fanon, 1969:68-74). The narator goes through romance, tragedy, and 
hatreds to become aware of the insignificance of human differences 
in comparison to the historical flow of events. 
 
Islam and Postmodernism 
Tayeb Salih’s narrator is the prototype of the modern Arab 
who comes to terms with the modernity, its anxiety and its promise, 
by forging an identity in the midst of rapid social and political 
change. God is absent from the narrator’s life and so are the 
transcendental values associated with rituals and festivals. Feelings 
of the absurd and of radical doubt permeate the novel. On his 
journey of self discovery, the narrator experiences and overcomes 
three major crises: upon his return to his village, he discovers an 
identity based on family, tribe, loving parents, brothers and sisters, 
and a grandfather who link him to the past. He does not reject this 
past completely. For him, the village represents stability and 
constancy in the midset of change, a place of purity because it has 
not been touched by foreign intruders. In the second, he is able to 
achieve love (and trust) by resolving what Erikson (1969) calls the 
crisis of intimidacy. In the third, he is exposed to the germs of 
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violence and oppression spread by Saeed, over comes the temptation 
and rises above all of this to a new feeling of hope. In the end, the 
author depicts the following affirmation of an evolving identity: 
 
I must be one of those birds that exist only in one region of the 
world...Over there is like here, neither better nor worse. But I 
am here from here, just as the date palm standing in the 
courtyard of our house has grown in our house and not in 
anyone else‘s. The the fact they came to our land, I know not 
why, does that mean that we should poison our present and 
our future ? Sooner or later they will leave our country jus as 
many people throughout history have left many countries. 
The railways, ships, factories, and schools will be ours and we 
will speak their languange without either a sense of guilt or a 
sense of gratitude. Once again we shall be as we were – 
ordinary people-  and if we are lies we shall be lies of our own 
making (Salih, 1978: 45-50).      
 
Tayeb Salih’s narrator discovers his ordinariness in his search for 
authenticity and opts for what Gidden (1991:214) call “life politics” 
which ultimately concern “political issues which flow from processes 
of self –actualization in post-traditional contex, where globalizing 
influences intrude deeply into the reflexive project of the self”. Life 
politics, in this case, deal with questions how one should live in a 
post-traditional order and against a backdrop of existential 
questions. Gannoushi’s journey, on the other hand, is a project of 
“emancipatory politics” which Gidden defines as a generic outlook 
concerned above all with liberating individuals and groups from 
constraints which adversely affect their life chances” (Gidden, 
1991:210-211). Emancipatory politics involves two main elements: “ 
the effort to shed shackles of the past, thereby permitting a 
transformative attituted toward  the future; and the aim of 
overcoming the illegitimate domination of some individuals or 
groups by other” (Gidden, 1991:211). Emancipatory politics is 
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concerned, abouve all, with themes of justice, equality, and 
participation, the very same themes that most Muslim reformers are 
in fact concerned with.     
 A recent example of scholarship which examines the Muslim 
phenomenon as an instance of emancipatory politics is Abrahamian’s 
excellent analysis of Khomeinism in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
“Khomeinism”, he concludes, “despite its religious dimensions, in 
may ways [it] resembles Latin American populism... a middle calss 
movement that mobilized the masses with radical sounding rethoric 
against the external powers and the entrenched power holding 
cultural and educational institutions than in overthrowing the modes 
of production and distribution” (Abrahamian, 1993:38).  
For Gidden, modernity consists of institutions and modes of 
behavior which by the middle of the twentieth century has become 
world historical in their impact. Its key dimensions include 
industrialism, capitalism, and the institutions of surveillance which 
are associated withe the rise of the modern nation-state (Gidden, 
1990). In the contemporary of Middle East, new states have emerged 
in the post-World War II periode and gradually have become linked 
in varying degrees to the rise of industrialism and capitalism in the 
modern world. These, new states were confronted with a number of 
crises that posed a variety of issues, among which are the question of 
legitimacy, decolonization, democracy, development, distribution of 
resources and integration (Ahmad, 1980;1980a;1981). 
The elites which came to power in these state emerged as 
“modern, educated, managerial elites isolated from the productive 
process, alienated from their culture sand in the face of continued 
dependency on external know-how and capital, unable to expand 
into a productive national bougeoise. This “power elite” in the 
Muslim countries concentrated its efforts on developing the 
mechanisms of surveillance by relying on modern bureaucratic 
methods of control in the context of national-security apparatus.  The 
economicmodels implemented in these countries superimposed 
upon traditional societies a capitalist economy unaccompannied by 
162    Jurnal Filsafat, Vol. 27, No. 2 Agustus 2017 
 
capitalist culture or capitalist democracy and produced a system at 
odds with the cultural and political institutions of the people it 
exploit. This meant that large segments if the population were, for all 
practical purposes, excluded from the process of economic 
development. They were, nonetheless, subject to the rigors of the 
new mechanisms of surveillance, social control, and 
dehumanization.    
How does this system of surveillance filter down to masses 
and shape everyday life? New practices begin to orient social social 
relations in the areas of modern education, organized religion, and 
government expertise; it is all done through elaborate bureaucracies 
and offical ideologies. These practices produce an effect of structure, 
meanning and program that is far removed from daily life of the 
people and has no immediate relevance to their lives. But it displaces 
village entertainments, small feast, games, religious events, visits to 
tombs of holly men, and other locally produced forms of imaginative 
life (Mitchell, 1990). 
The most important effect of these official practices is that 
they tend to shift the locus of control over the production of symbols, 
so much a part of the daily life in a Muslim society, to a far away 
place (the national capital). The process of generating such 
“enframing” mechanisms and symbols is appropriorited by the 
organs of the modern state such as the television authority, the 
national radio, and the Ministry of Information among many others. 
By and large, the large, the new symbols appear to be alien to local 
people and far removed from the daily concerns and ways of life.    
Yet, even though the grid of modern surveillance penetrates 
deep into every corner of life in the modern Middle East, society as 
whole is never completely dominated by it. A variety of “miniscule”, 
“popular” procedures serve to undermine the ubiquitos mechanism 
of control. Women, for instance, wear the modest dress that covers 
most of the body and the head as a way of subscribing to a new 
pattern of Islamic behavior and as a form of resistance to dominant 
Western pattern of dress. Muslim attire becomes an affirmation of an 
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identity and a rejection of Western habits. For many young men, 
wearing a beard become a similar symbol. This is part of what Kepel 
(1984), in his analysis of modern Egypt, call “popular forms of 
expression” that have flourished in Egypt in a “welter of forms of 
expression ranging from what Michael certeau has called ‘ways of 
getting by’ to more elaborate forms of communalism like the Sufi 
brotherhoods” (Kepel, 1984:232). 
These popular forms of resistance occur because people do 
have a limited margin of autonomy in areas which are immune to 
control by the institutions of legal political life. Mosques in poor 
urban neighborhoods and various religious organizations and 
charities often constitute the web of such resistance activities. 
Sometimes, more elaborate forms of resistance to oppression begin to 
emerge in the form of religious reform movements. Some of them 
might include a militant wing that carries out para-military activities 
and some may simply rely on political agitation and mobilization. In 
nearly all cases, these formns of resistance involve a similar 
psychological trajectory: a process of emigration (hijra) from an 
alienated society followed by rebellion against it.  
In Islamic history, the first and the most important migration 
(hijra) was of course that of the prophet and his followers who 
escaped oppressive Mecca to Medina. Here, the prophet established 
the nucleus of the Muslim polity with a constitutional charter and a 
system of government. For Shukri Mustapha, for example, one of the 
leaders of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt, hijra is first and 
foremost an act of withdrawal (spiritual and psysical) from jahiliya 
society (the society that does not recognize God). In the heart of 
Cairo’s poor suburbs, he and his followers tried to create, in tiny 
furnished flats, a genuinely Islamic society of their own, based on 
their understanding of Islam (Kepel, 1984:89). For others, like the 
Tunisian Gannoushi, it meant hijra first to the Levant and then to 
exile in Europe. For the others still, it meant internal exile in the 
prisons of the various Arab countries. Prisons, in the Middle East, are 
commonly referred to as the best schools or universities of political 
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training. This is where many Muslim activists end up receiving their 
basic religious education and underego their conversion to new 
Islam. If they enter prison with nothing but the rudiments of 
religious ofpolitical education, they will often as accomplished 
militants and effective activits.   
In a attempt to defuse critisim by militant groups, the 
Egyptian government recently selected a poor neighborhood in 
which to build new low–income housing, repair sewers, pave roads, 
and bring in electricity and running water. The benefits of 
development, so long denied, have thus belatedly found their way to 
some of the poor. These symbolic gestures by the state are 
juxtaposed to self-help efforts by Islamic groups who consistently 
feed the poor, educate their children. Provide them with basic health 
care, and come to their aid following a recent earthquake. In the 
process, Islamic groups established parallel structures which provide 
the kind of assistance that the modern state has given only to the 
privileged.   
 
CONCLUSION 
One may conclude that there is indeed a alternate Islamic 
religious and moral experience which differs makedly from the 
official experience generated by the various governments that came 
into being in the post-World War II period. In its broad outlines, it 
represents a fundamental act of rebellion against alienating 
experiences, that result from the inclusion of the Arab world into a 
global system dominated by modernism and its institutions. As such, 
this rebllion removes large masses of people from the market of 
modern consumption and poses serious challenges to the modern 
apparatus of control and surveilance. 
At its core, the new Islamic experience involves a redefination 
of identity in a world which has become homogenized by the 
globalizing process of modernism. It is, at the same time, an assertion 
of the ned to reject diversity in the cultural and social spheres of life 
and call for more active participation in the political sphere. The 
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Islamic experience is therefore a call for an emancipatory politics 
which means justice where there is none, a more egalitarian 
distribution of wealth and a more democratic system of decision 
making. 
The teoritical work remains to be done; nowhere in the 
contemporary Islamic literature does one find, for example, a 
formulation similar yo John Rawls’s theory of justice or even an 
awereness of the rich political and philosophical critique now being 
formulated in the West by major thinkers whose work represents a 
reformulation of the core of modernism. At the same time, major 
efforts need to be made toredefine social relations in a way that 
meets the basic criteria of democracy in an Islamic society: What are 
the basic guarantees of human rights and civil liberties? What 
guarantess are there for minorities ? What is the role of women in 
Muslim society?  
The status of women appears to be much on the minds of the 
leading the teoriticians of the new Islamic movements. The Sudanese 
scholar-political activist Hasan Turabi (1992), for example suggests 
that the status of women must be redefined in a way that guarantees 
full equality form women in all areas of public life. He makes a 
distinction between “historical Islam” where certain erroneous 
practices have intruded into the behavior of Muslim and “real Islam” 
which does not sanction the oppression of women. It remains to be 
seen what new formulations are made and how they are 
implemented. Given the fact that the majority of the new activists are 
highly educated men and women, it is unlikely that the prevailing 
oppresive conditions which have characterized the status of women 
in Muslim society will contineu to exist. Change is much more likely 
to occur among the new Muslim activists and not in the more 
traditional societies in Arab world (such as the more oppresive 
countries of the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and others). 
Wether the new Islamic movements eventually achieve 
political and cultural hegemony in the Arab world cannot be 
predicated. However, the Arab world will undoubtedly be altered as 
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a result of their emergence. So one should not be too quick to dismiss 
them as emphemeral ideological eruptions which are likely to be 
superseded or coopted by the moreawesome power of the modern 
state.    
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